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It was already Hannah Arendt, who, referring to Kant, emphasized the difference between 
truth and meaning, between practical common sense and opinions1. It is interesting that 
the common sense approach is still completely dominant today, even among theologians, 
who are so often accused of irrationality – or perhaps just because of it. Theology seems 
to feel compelled to appeal to common sense, to show the modern world, that it is useful, 
or at least that it is not harmful. Our discussion in this essay concerns the relationship be-
tween religion and violence. We will try and explore the problem on the fundamental lev-
el, with no pretensions to offer yet another proposal in the style of “how to ...”, that mod-
ern requirements for practicality require and expect.
First, we will take a very brief look at the underlying reasons for the insistence on 
practicality and applicability of theology. It was already Ratzinger who showed that the 
replacement of Verum est ens with Verum quia factum2 is the path to the establishment of 
the modern secular thought. Between truth and factuality an equality sign was drawn, so 
that eventually factum became faciendum – Verum quia faciendum3. Factum has prov-
en to be insecure and inaccessible, subject to interpretation and interpretation – only fa-
ciendum remained. So the man became faciendum, a “technical” being, managed by the 
technique, or which can be controlled by using different techniques. The term τέχνη, 
which originally meant artistic skill, is reduced to the technology as an “organization of 
knowledge for practical use”.4 So religion had to find its technical place in the technical 
world. Because of the questionable effectiveness, the place of religion can not be other 
than marginal and controversial.
On the other hand, violence, especially physical, warrior-like and criminal – is 
very effective, and has taken an honorary place in many accounts. These considerations 
have, however, as Hannah Arendt observed, mainly dealt with the use of violence and 
not with violence as such5. Religion is in such examinations subordinate – it must show 
and actually needs to convince a skeptical listener, that it still has some potential to re-
duce violence, to heal wounds, to repair the damage that has brought violence. In this 
1 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 1981, p. 57.
2 Ratzinger, Einführung in das Christentum: Vorlesungen über das Apostolische Glaubensbekenntnis, 
2005, p. 23.
3 Ratzinger, Einführung in das Christentum, p. 28.
4 Mesthene, “The Role of Technology in Society”, 1997, p. 74.
5 Hannah Arendt, On Violence, 1970, p. 8.
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way religion is supposed to justify its own existence. On the other hand, religion is ac-
cused of fueling, that it is certainly an accomplice if not the main instigator of violence.6
We consciously ignore this way of posing the problem, and we will not enter into a 
debate with pro et contra arguments in terms of responsibility and the positive potential 
of religion in relation to violence. After all, these arguments are sufficiently well known, 
but ultimately do not give a satisfactory answer.
In addition to these external reasons, there are internal reasons for insisting on the 
practical applicability of the Christian theological discourse. In addition to the reasons 
quoted referring to Ratzinger’s analysis, we will present another, which we believe to be 
crucial, and it concerns the self-understanding of the Church. The eschatological dimen-
sion that has so strongly determined the Christian identity in the ancient Church, suffered 
a moving to the back. The faith in the presence of the eschaton here and now, although 
still “mirror, dimly” (1 Cor 13,12) is faded or blurred. The eschatological reality of the 
Kingdom the faithful lived as a messianic rest in the mode ὡς μὴ (1 Cor 7: 29–32)7, has 
grown into a life in the Kantian mode als-ob (as if) from where it easy became let us. Es-
chatology was moved to the back, transcended from history, so that the eucharistic ser-
vice began to be perceived as abstract by the world and man, and more and more fre-
quently the question arose of what we really can do here and now specifically. Here and 
now – apart from that and there – has become a measure of Christian life, from whence 
an autonomous, moralistic, pietistic ethics emerged, theoretically loosely and practical-
ly almost not at all related to the event of the Eucharist and the Kingdom. Maranatha (1 
Cor 16, 22) has lost its multi-temporality and moved to the area of  the mythical concep-
tions of the future in a deist key.
The terms “religion” and “violence”, at first glance seem clear and self-determined. 
We all know what religion is and we all know what violence is. These are concepts that 
we use regularly. What do we really mean when we say religion and what do we really 
mean when we say violence? Trying to give a most general definition of religion leads us 
to the conclusion that things are not at all simple. Perhaps it is comforting that, as Kola-
kowski notes, even terms like “art”, “society”, “history”, “culture”, are not in a better po-
sition8. There are many attempts to find a proper definition of the concept of religion. The 
number of attempts is so great that it we could establish a sort of history of defining the 
concept of religion9. One of the most common definitions of religion would be the one in 
the Encyclopedia Britannica, which states that it is “human beings’ relation to that which 
they regard as holy, sacred, absolute, spiritual, divine, or worthy of especial reverence.”10 
6 Selengut believes that although religion can be misused, it still carries an assumption of conflict. „Each 
religious community is convinced of the truth and legitimacy of its theological claims and is, on occasion, 
ready to wage war and engage in violence in support of what it takes to be an absolute religious truth (Selen-
gut, Sacred Fury: Understanding Religious Violence, 2003, p 224).
7 Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, 2005, p. 23 et passim.
8 Kolakowski, Religion: If There Is No God: On God, the Devil, Sin, and Other Worries of the So-Called 
Philosophy of Religion, 2001, p. 9. 
9 Jensen and Rothstein, Secular Theories on Religion: Current Perspectives, 2000; Kunin, Religion: The 
Modern Theories, 2003.
10 Religion. 2015. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Retrieved 18 February, 2015, from http://www.bri-
tannica.com/EBchecked/topic/497082/religion
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Kolakowski offers a definition according to which the phenomenon of religion described 
as “socially established worship of eternal reality”11, which is a somewhat narrower defi-
nition. And the broad-based definition as in Britannica could be further expanded since it 
does not involve a multitude of other, equally accurate characteristics of religion. More-
over, as we will see later, secularization offers some turnovers in the understanding of 
religion, which, however, is not essential though it seems to be. Even in a secular society 
that denies the value of religion, or at least its publicity, religiosity is very much present, 
but it occurs in the form of political parties, football games, national ideas, scientism or 
psychotherapy sessions.12 Religion was suppressed in his usual expression, but its “me-
chanics” continue to function. The development of secularization in the Christian West 
is described in detail by Kantorowicz. In his analysis of the development of the idea of 
the the king’s two bodies, the process of transferring the religious matrix to the secular 
ones is showed in detail. Kantorowicz proves that secular doctrines of modern society 
have their roots in the medieval development of the legal system where the learned men, 
mostly lawyers, were raised to the level of a social group of their own. Simultaneously 
with the heavenly knighthood of the clergy (militia coelestis), armed chivalry of the aris-
tocracy (militia armata), originated the learned chivalry, or doctoral knighthood (militia 
doctoralis)13. Secularization did not consist of denying the attributes of holiness on ei-
ther the practical or theoretical level, but they were passed on to the secular level. It was 
this transfer that was crucial to the process and the was of secularization in the contem-
porary Christian society. Interestingly, the process of secularization here includes creat-
ing structures that are taken for granted as secular today. Thus, the royal religious media-
tion, as Kantorowicz notes, suffered apparent secularization. The King was less and less 
regarded as rex iustus in the rank of Melchizedek and was increasingly losing his messi-
anic and biblical designation. The eschatological picture of the king – “it survived at the 
price of being transferred from the altar to the bench.”14 The secularization of the course 
took place on the property field, too, which leads to the equalization of property rights 
of the Church and the King. Not only had the relationship Christus/fiscus become equal 
in legal terms, but the fiscus received eternal and impersonal (persona ficta – a fictitious 
person) characteristics very similar to those that now has our fiscal system, from which 
it got its name.15 In this process, the fiscus turned into something quasi-sacred, becom-
ing a goal in itself, starting to represent the state and its ruler, which eventually led to the 
equalization of the terms fiscus and patria.16
Bearing all this in mind, let us return to the definition of religion itself: the broadest 
definition would be that it is a fundamental sense, or the search for meaning. This way, 
we leave space to secular and religious practices labeled as religious. Religion – or rather 
11 Kolakowski, Religion, p. 12.
12 Additions to this list could be very broad, especially in the field of different ideologies. Fascism was 
certainly one of the forms of secular religion with the most drastic consequences (Cf. Benjamin, Secular 
Salvations, 1965).
13 Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, 1997, p. 124.
14 Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, 1997, p. 140.
15 Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, 1997, p. 178.
16 Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, 1997, p. 189. It is no coincidence, and not only for pragmatic 
reasons, that tax evasion is considered one of the worst offenses in the West, even betrayal of the country, for 
which severe penalties are enforced.
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the man himself – can never really be relieved of that what is transcendent. But the pla-
tonic ἐπέκεινα can change the place in the ontological orbit. Transcendent becomes im-
manent – or put another way, what is claimed as a human rises to the point where it be-
comes transcendent.
We mentioned that today there are plenty of religious practices that those who 
practice them usually refuse to identify them as religious. This way an entirely new spe-
cies of an otherwise known religious pathology is created. Addressing this issue would 
lead us away from our subject. We will satisfy ourselves by citing a passage from the ex-
cellent book by Ernst Becker – The Denial of Death, where he analyzes a specific prob-
lem of the end of the psychoanalytic process, where he clearly indicates the religious 
mode of this secular practice. Becker says: For generations now, the psychoanalysts, not 
understanding this historical problem, have been trying to figure out why the “termina-
tion of the transference” in therapy is such a devilish problem in many cases. Had they 
read and understood Rank, they would quickly have seen that the “thou” of the therapist 
is the new God who must replace the old collective ideologies of redemption. As the in-
dividual can not serve God as he must give rise to a truly devilish problem. Modern man 
is condemned to seek the meaning of his life and psychological introspection, and with 
his new confessor has to be the supreme authority on introspection, the psychoanalyst. 
As this is so, the patient’s “beyond” is limited to the analytic couch and the world-view 
imparted there.In this sense, as Rank saw with such deep understanding, psychoanaly-
sis actually stultifies the emotional life of the patient. Man wants to focus his love on an 
absolute measure of power and value, and the analyst tells him that all is reducible to his 
early conditioning and is therefore relative. Man wants to find and experience the mar-
velous, and the analyst tells him how matter-of-fact everything is, how are clinically ex-
plainable our deepest ontological motives and Guilts. Man is thereby deprived of the ab-
solute mystery he needs, and the only omnipotent thing that then remains is the man who 
explained it away. And so the patient clings to the analyst with all his might and dreads 
terminating the analysis.17 This quote is primarily interesting for us as a good example of 
“secular religion”. Far from it that our goal is simple criticism of such practices. Its pro-
ponents could definitely easily find sufficient counter-arguments in the classical religious 
expression, or at least enough of pathology. This is not about what is better for man – to 
be classically or secularly religious; our observations lead in the direction of the religious 
practices that are not necessarily identical to the conventional ones, precisely because 
they are fundamental to the very definition of man. The proliferation of meanings of the 
term religion, creates the illusion of substantive secularization of modern man and his 
social relations just for the careless eye. This assertion is easily recognized as the thesis 
of man as homo religiosus18. The goal is not originality of insight per se, but an attempt 
to create the meta-narrative on the matrices of religion and violence.
It is clear that the naive denial of the religious matrix in secular religious systems 
actually refers only to the old religious structure, embodied in the “enchanted” world and 
objects laden with divine power. New religious structures do not provide enough new 
things to be able to differentiate themselves from religion. On a general societal level, as 
17 Becker, The Denial of Death, 1973, 194–195.
18 Psychological research shows that religiosity (and, we would add culture in general) are quite insepa-
rable from man, it is even immanent in the infantile level of development.
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noted by Schmidt, modern concepts of the secular state are secularized theological con-
cepts, and we would say the manifestation of religious matrix. The whole process is suc-
cessfully described by Kantorowicz through the Christus/Fiscus dialectic. Rene Girard 
has, in his inevitable study “Violence and the Sacred,” offered some answers, which are, 
however, only partially satisfactory. Girard sees the necessity of transcendence only in 
the context of his view, according to which violence is the cause of religion, which aims 
to restrain it, preventive or curative, in order to prevent anarchic and socially destructive 
revenge.19 This view is too one-sided. There’s more than violence (and revenge), which 
represents the core of the need for transcendence, and that is particularly the need for 
meaning. We see how the concept of religion is complex, and from the above it is clear 
that it can easily be problematized further. The answer to the question of why religion is 
so difficult to define, lies in the fact that religion until recently – and in many societies 
today – was inseparably united with all the expressions and manifestations of human so-
cial existence. Charles Taylor described this oneness well, namely the identity of religion 
to the structure of human society, so that it makes a fundamental anthropological compo-
nent. If we accept religiosity, widely specified as confidence in the ontological and ethi-
cal purpose, as an anthropological constant, it will be easier for us to understand the deep 
complexity of the issues before us, as well as the unacceptable superficiality of various 
pro and anti attitudes that often play parts in the public discourse.
The definition of the term violence is not easier. Today we are accustomed to 
talking about violence as something exclusive, something that is connected with war – 
which for most Western countries represents distant events on the TV screen – or some-
thing strictly pathological, such as violence in the family or violence against animals. 
However, the immanence of violence was not missed by many researchers.
And the violence has received its sophisticated shape. This sophistication is best 
seen in the development of the war technology, which minimizes the participation of 
more troops, although, paradoxically, increases the number of civilian casualties. On the 
domestic non-war plan, the violence is even more camouflaged in the form of actual en-
slavement of broad masses of the people who are forced to work all day, caught in a tan-
gle of credit indebtedness caused by the creation of a consumer mentality. It is clear that 
violence can not be just physical. But in the end all violence is physical. Even if the beat-
ing stick is not used, it always stands behind the door, ready to be used should the need 
arise. As indeed many researchers have confirmed, the state is an expression of power 
and power is ultimately violence20. Violence, inseparably connected with the powers can 
be transformed by the brutal use of force over qualified or institutionalized force, coming 
to technocratic rule of bureaucracy in which Nobody is a tyrant, a tyrant scariest of all.21 
Here we can draw a parallel between religion as a relationship with God and the super-
natural and secularized religious matrix on the one hand and classic violence and its con-
temporary, so to speak, alienated expression. Alienated religiosity that is not recognized 
as such and alienated violence (estranged expression of power) that is not recognized as 
19 Girard, La Violence et le sacré, 1972, p. 43.
20 Cf. Mills, The Power Elite, 2000: 171. Drawing on Bertrand de Jouvenel, Hannah Arendt rightly raises 
the question of whether the end of the war would lead to the dissolution of the states and whether the disap-
pearance of violence between states meant the disappearance of power? (Arendt, On Violence, 1970.p. 37).
21 Arendt, On Violence, 1970, p. 38.
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such are elements of the alienated world of the modern man who still lives in the modes 
of religiosity and violence, but it does no longer recognize them.
How then should really understand our topic on relationship between religion and 
violence – or how to ask the question? If both religion and violence are anthropological 
constants, if they build humanity itself, how it is possible to analyze them as independent 
or at least sufficiently separate phenomena? Here we return to Girard and his thesis on 
the fundamental violence. In his argument certainly there is a lot of truth. Yes, violence 
is inherent to man as well as culture, which is by definition religious. In this sense, reli-
gion is certainly an answer to violence. But the question is what is behind the violence? 
Girard himself says that in the animal world there is no threat of mutual annihilation. 
The existence of such dangers is inherent in the human species. It is obvious that in man 
natural (instinctive) mechanisms that regulate the level of violence are not functioning 
enough so that it provides security and not endanger the survival of the species. What is 
hiding behind the uncontrolled violence that has to be reined in by religious introduc-
tion into the symbolic order of reality? Here we come to what Girard failed to analyze 
sufficiently, and that are the funeral customs, which indicate the relationship to death. In 
the act of burying our loved ones – in relation to the death – hides the real foundation of 
religion and violence. It is burials that represent a specific human feature, which shows 
the man as the one who does not accept, who is not at peace with death. The earliest ex-
pressions of religiosity, and thus culture, were not rituals of sacrifice, but burial ceremo-
nies. It is certainly not a coincidence that the Tumulus de Barnenez, the oldest known hu-
man structure, is actually a cemetery.22 It is this “moment” when a man buries his loved 
one, when he lays stones around his head while burying him in the ground, is the basis 
of man’s religion and culture. It is a transformation, or perhaps a manifestation of the 
spirit of God blows into our nose. The sacrifice here has the function of maintaining or 
restoring a dead man in the community – that is a function of denial of death and striv-
ing to overcome it. Sacrifice is sharing with the dead one,23 communion with him, which 
is essentially the negation of his death as the final – biological – cessation of existence.
This radically dislocated encounter with death, actually the relocation of the death 
out of the natural order, forms the basis for the transformation of violence from natural 
to cultural. Cultural violence has objectives that differ from the natural. Education of the 
social order, including the order of sacrifices, is based in the relocation of death or rather 
its negation. Because it denies death, the man forms a society that is different from the 
horde, pack or herd. Because he does not want to accept death, man establishes the soci-
ety as a means to fight against death. As Baudrillard notes, no death was natural for prim-
itive peoples, but it is always a social act and the act of opponent will and not biology.24 
The foundation of human society is the tomb of a loved one. When people first gathered 
to bury a neighbor, then their communities structured, of course, not intentionally, but 
spontaneously. We must be careful with this “first time”. This “first” is the only thinkable 
but not really available. It is rather in the realm of the Lacanian Real, which we had to 
forget to be people.25 This is a basic step, connected with the phenomenon of reflection 
22 Cf. Le Roux et Lecerf, Le grand cairn de Barnenez – Mausolée néolithique, 2003.
23 Cf. Baudrillard, L’échange symbolique et la mort, p. 203.
24 Cf. Baudrillard, L’échange symbolique et la mort, p. 251.
25 If we stick to Lacan, then we would say that it is impossible to imagine the origin of language or what 
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Chardin26 was talking about, equated with cognition of man as one who knows. When the 
neighbor is buried, when his death was denied, the regulated relations between people 
are constituted: family, genus, tribe. Through the funeral rites the dead not only remain 
in communion with the living, but structure their relationships27. Only if the death by ex-
change was introduced in a social relationship, then the relationship can be real. This re-
ality is based just on the fact that displaces real/realistic28 from man’s existential horizon. 
Only when death is seen as outdated, human relations can be structured. This structur-
ing is manifested as the creation of family and kinship relations, and the emergence of 
the first elements of the law by prohibiting murder, incest, etc29. As noted Zsolt Lazar30, 
over time society deposits taboos, customs and social norms that seem meaningless, but 
which have their roots in the establishment of the original order. Only in a society that is 
already structured and in which the symbolic order is used to protect from the real one, 
there is the possible emergence of a real fundamental violence as described by Girard 
and its overcoming through the sacrificial crisis. Fundamental violence is essentially bi-
ological, driven by a common biological motifs (meeting basic needs, the struggle over 
women, the desire to dominate), but it is only in a structured community that it occurs 
in its frantic version that endangers the biological survival of the whole group. Cultural 
violence hides the potential to “go wild” just because it’s always repressed by the cult, 
which includes at least some kind of law. Structuring the human community is unnatural 
and therefore the natural regulators of violence can not adequately function in human so-
ciety. Structuring human society is pervasive. Its roots go back to the very beginning and 
define the man, changing his biological givens. In contrast to the animal world food must 
be prepared, children are born without the ability to self-survival, violence is restrained 
by cult and legally (although this is not separable). Fundamental violence, therefore, is 
not fundamental at all, it is implied by the structuring of communities that is enabled by 
the attitude towards death or the dead. The occurrence of such violence is a reaction to 
the unnatural structuring of the human community. Going into the symbolic order of the 
human world is what makes a man a man, but the price is paid at the level of animality. 
it was before language, as we can imagine only within the symbolic order. In other words, how much are we 
as listed in the symbolic order in general able to imagine human reality that was pre-symbolic? Specifically, 
how human would such a reality be at all?
26 de Chardin, Le Phénomène Humain, 1956, p. 181–182.
27 With this structuring occur phenomena that we consider anthropological constants. Structures are ma-
terially changed even in the elements which seem to us as the most fundamental. But the content of structure 
is not the most fundamental. It is a variable while the structures themselves are secure. On the transformation 
of cultural and ethical structural content in ancient Greece see Dodds (Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, 
1973, p. 28–64). What always remains ist the structure of religion/culture.
28 Cf. Baudrillard, L’échange symbolique et la mort, p. 204.
29 So, sexuality is not the ground on which nature and culture first met, as Baumann claims citing Lévi-
Strauss. This view is based on nineteenth-century Scientia Sexualis based on Freudian generalization of 
specific cultural patterns of certain social circles of the epoch. Bauman himself notes that Freud’s conception 
according to which in the civilized sexual morality the original sexual goal of is sublimated into a socially 
useful goal, today no longer stands since sexual objects and aspirations no longer masquerade as socially use-
ful, because “It seems that the link between the sublimation of sexuas insticts and its repression, deemed by 
Freud to be indispensable condition of any orderly social arrangment, has been broken.” As Baumann himself 
notes (Bauman, Liquid Love: On the Frailty of Human Bonds, 2003, p. 54–55.) sexuality is not a fundamental 
element which forms a cultural reality. In the 19th century it seemed that this is so, but today we can see that 
it is not. It is obvious that something else is the ἀρχή of human culture.
30 Lazar, Značaj primitivne magije, Antropološko-sociološki pristup, 2008, p. 164.
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Man’s natural self has to suffer in its entirety, man is torn between the two laws, the laws 
of biological needs and desires and laws of social structure that often stands against those 
needs and desires. That frustration creates the basis for the emergence of frenzied vio-
lence that causes unclear ἂτη described in the Homeric writings31. Frantical violence oc-
curs as a rebellion against the structured order of the community. Through the denial of 
death, through a non-natural attitude towards death, violence is transformed into some-
thing non-natural. It no longer serves only to maintain life or fight about women, but ex-
presses the aspiration of the individual towards authenticity. The attitude towards death 
changes the perspective of self-understanding. A man “does not live on bread alone” 
anymore. Once he expressed his belief in immortality by burying his neighbor, he ex-
pressed his belief in his own immortality and uniqueness. This uniqueness, as noted by 
Gorazd Kocijančič, the idviduum ineffabile (unutterably individual) is ontological by na-
ture. Being what I am is for me to be at all, in which there is no exterior, and each reflec-
tion and introspection is mediated by hypostasis as being32. Death is not the final point 
anymore, but that point which can, which must be overcome. Violence becomes one of 
the fields of authentification. Violence is a way for a bully to impos himself as unique, 
as the one who is. This applies to internal violence in the group but also for outside. The 
war was also relocated from the natural order of battle for resources. Therefore, the war 
is often being lead without real biological reasons. In the history of mankind wars waged 
because of the pressing need for survival, are the exception and not the rule.
War is an expression of the ambivalent need to preserve the social structure at all 
costs – since it is based on the non-biological notion if death – and to confirm the au-
thenticity of their own through the negation of the structure. The individual, in order to 
overcome this ambivalencе, identifies with his group, and for the confirmation of his 
uniqueness seeks to destroy another group or by imposing their own identity onto some-
one else. War is because of that both natural and unnatural. What we are afraid of and to 
what we have been so inclined. War represents both affirmation and negation of social 
order and identity. Through the negation of another’s social order and identity the own is 
determined because we take our charge against our own symbolic order out on the ene-
my, without adverse consequences. On the contrary, the own social structures and iden-
tities are confirmed and determined. War has always been a motor that brought together 
and united a society at war. Not only did the war confirm the identity and social structure 
but also created them, they were created in the war. Πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, as 
Heraclitus spoke. Throughout the war the identity and state organization are determined 
and confirmed but created, too. Foucault reversed the famous aphorism of Clausewitz 
showing that politics really is war by other means, which implies that after the war the 
actual political power has a role in society that maintains a kind of silent war, or that the 
balance of power acquired in the war is enrolled into existing institutions. But not only in 
institutions, but also in language, in economic relations, primarily in inequality. “Politics 
is the confirmation and renewal of the imbalance of forces that participated in the war.”33 
This tells us that the violence of war is actually immanent to every society. When a soci-
ety is in crisis, when its structure is dysfunctional and when it can not maintain internal 
31 Cf. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, 1973, p. 3–5.
32 Kocijančič, Razbiće: sedam radikalnih eseja, 2013, p. 32 et passim.
33 Foucault, Il faut défendre la société : Cours au Collège de France (1975–1976), 1997, p. 21.
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equilibrium, it is prone to war, which appears as a cathartic means to re-establish order. 
In this sense, Heraclitus argued that “war is the father of all things” because “things” are 
the social structure that is – it should be noted – quite inseparable from man’s “second 
nature,” which he defines as Aristotelian ζῷον πολιτικόν (social animal). War is an es-
sential horror to achieve peace, constitute and preserve identity.
It has already been pointed out that religion and violence can not be seen as sep-
arate phenomena. Actually in general can not be regarded as phenomena, much less as 
objects, as already Heidegger claimed34. Both religion and violence are at the core of hu-
manity. Here we can look back at the eschatological realism of St. Basil the Great, who 
says that being a man is not something given but set as a goal. The only optimism can be 
eschatological. Violence is impossible to overcome in the human world as we know it, 
it is in its very foundation. It more or less can not hide its face (behind the TV, the moral 
indignation or bow tie and briefcase), but, as the writer Bukowski says, it always shows 
“that behind paper masks is that old dad.” The Christian faith is hoping for the new heav-
ens and new earth, when the religious matrix will really cease to exist because the reason 
for their existence will cease to exist – and this is essentially a death. The same is true for 
violence. There is no use to build an optimistic picture of the world with false hopes. Vi-
olence has been there and will be until the end of time. Christians, even when they are the 
majority, are still the “little flock, the chosen people “, the rest who manifest something 
that still isn’t there because religion is the “hypostasis of things we hope for and assur-
ance about what we do not see” (Heb 11: 1). In the Christian experience there is no room 
for optimism in this world, but there is room for optimism for the future, when the truth 
will show itself as identical with the life and structure with freedom. Our hope is that the 
last enemy – death – will be abolished and our mission is to preach “until that comes”. Of 
course, this approach is extremely impractical from the viewpoint of the world. But prac-
tical advice should not be expected from theologians, at least Christian. Being impracti-
cal at the present time is unpopular, perhaps even dangerous – in fact, it was always so. 
Christ himself is condemned because it was not practical. Impracticality should not be 
declared for quietism because it is not the same. Christian action is the right action but 
not by the standards of this world.
Concerning the practical tools that are available to us, they are generally known. 
Increasing awareness among the people about the value of every man, instilling strong 
moral beliefs, democratic control of government through free media, etc. This is all so 
familiar, though, and so ineffective. If violence, at least in mediated form can not be 
overcome, perhaps, just perhaps, the correct approach lies in Žižek’s proposal to replace 
the meaningless reasons for hatred with less meaningless: “The way to fight ethnic Hat-
erd effectiveley is going through its immediate counterpart, ethnic tolerance; on the con-
trary, what we need is even more hatred, but proper political hatred: hatred directed at 
the common political enemy.”35 But this approach remains within the boundaries of this 
world and is bounded by its possibilities and impossibilities. The impossibility is hid-
den in the fact that the violence, whatever its motive, at the end shows that is has no true 
reason – it will prove to be a goal itself in itself. In this regard, all violence is in the fi-
nal analysis wild, no matter how strongly it is disguised in the face of reason. The only 
34 Heidegger, Phänomenologie des religiosen Lebens, (II. Abteilung, Vorlesungen 1919–1944), 1995, p. 
35 Žižek, The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For?, 2000, p. 11.
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(Christian) response is eschatological charity, accepting that “maybe” as the sole deter-
mination of the other, the other as a possible but not certain. As Derrida notes, “some 
possible that would only be possible (but not impossible), a safe and a certain, acceptable 
in advance as possible, it would be bad possible, possible with no future, one possibility 
already put aside, if you could call it that, is doomed to life. It would be a program, i.e., 
it would be a causality, a development, a reeling without event.”36 Or, to use Kožev’s re-
mark that theology without teleology is nothing but causality37. The eschatological love 
presupposes eschatological freedom. But as the eschaton is made present in history al-
though “in the mirror and dimly”, so is freedom. Accepting the other as a unique and 
irreplaceable necessarily makes our future uncertain. As Zygmunt Bauman observes, 
“making someone else determined by means presenting an indefinite future.”38 And that 
ambiguity and uncertainty of future is pledged to death as the ultimate separation as 
“death is suffering brought to the most intense peak of Solitude” as noted by Lubardić 
interpreting Shestov39. Now we come to the point where we can answer the question of 
what is an authentic Christian action?
The eschatological orientation towards the heavenly Jerusalem as the only true city 
does not mean that Christians have no other social responsibility in a historical world ex-
cept that the preaching and manifestation of the Kingdom of God. Christian eschatology 
is not passive, it is not reduced to waiting for the end. It involves the active participation 
in the event of the realization of the Kingdom which is through the Holy Spirit present 
here and now in history. This preaching and manifesting of the Kingdom is a key action 
and main service of the Christians as a rest, which gives them an identity, making them 
what they are. The offering of the Eucharistic gifts to God the Father is to introduce the 
world to a new mode of existence that changes his τρὁπος τῆς ὐπαρξεως. This is an act 
that no one except the Church of Christ can do. This change in the way of the existence 
involves a change of structure as the last enemy that is death will be abolished. With the 
abolition of the death, all structures and modes of existence will be transformed, since 
death was the cause of structuring the “old man”. Due to death, man’s mode of existence 
is disrupted. Every struggle for a better world if not Eucharistic is essentially doomed to 
failure. In the best case. At worst it is an apocalyptic scenario of nuclear or other disas-
ters. It is not necessary to have special knowledge of history to know that the tendency 
of mankind to such failures proved almost as a rule.
But to even be able to exercise their mission, Christians must be human, which, let 
us remember again st. Basil the Great, has not been given but set out as a goal. The Eu-
charistic service of the world is given to man, and to be a man means social responsibili-
ty and sensitivity. More precisely, the lack of concern for others, for their misery and de-
spair, agony and suffering brings into question our own humanity, and thus our service 
to the Sacrament of Christ. The good Samaritan is the paradigm of Christ, and the Chris-
tian paradigm of acting here and now – “let your light shine before men, that they may 
see your good deeds and praise your Father in heaven.” (Mt 5, 16). The lack of charity 
36 Derrida, Politiques de l’amitie: Suivi de L’oreille de Heidegger, 1994, p. 46.
37 Kožev, Kant, 1976, p. 117 (serbian translation).
38 Bauman, Liquid Love: On the Frailty of Human Bonds, 2003, p. 20.
39 Lubardić, Filosofija vere Lava Šestova: Apofatička dekonstrukcija razuma i mogućnosti religijske fi-
losofije; 2010, p. 221.
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or worse hatred of one’s neighbor, prevents Christians to exercise their mission of “roy-
al priesthood”. Christians are not of this world (Jn 15, 18), but their service for the life 
of the world. Peace will be realized only when Christ comes but peacemaking is a mani-
festation of humanity. If you are not a Christian peacemaker then you can not inherit the 
land which shall transform. That is why Christians are “doomed” to actively participate 
in the things of this world, because this meets the basic precondition of their mission, 
and it is to be human, to be people who are still in this world. Humanity is not biologi-
cal, but a moral and ontological category. And here we have in mind the ontology which 
is relational and dynamic and not static and hermetical. The ontology includes man’s re-
lationship with God through a relationship to man, and that relationship fortifies the spe-
cial ontological Christian ethics.
Christian action, to the extent that it is authentic will never be effective. Efficien-
cy is inconsistent with authenticity, because to be effective we have to forget the spe-
cific nature of our service. Those who are outside will always be more efficient because 
the “children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light.” (Lk 
16: 8). But the presumed inefficiency should not be an obstacle to the operation, because 
taking action (or inaction) determines the ecclesial identity. Christians must not forget 
that they are not of this world and that their service to the world is different. On the other 
hand it must not be forgotten that the lack of concern for one’s neighbor, or even causing 
a neighbor pain, calls into question their service and very ecclesiality, since “God is able 
of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham.” (Lk 3:8).
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